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ON JIM FLEMING’S ANTI-ORIGINALISM 
FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION. By 
James E. Fleming.1 New York: Oxford University Press. 
2015. Pp. xv + 243. $75.00 (cloth). 
Sotirios A. Barber2 
When Jim Fleming and I completed our 2007 book, 
Constitutional Interpretation: The Basic Questions (CIBQ),3 we 
left the interpretive debate and turned to other projects, Jim to 
his book with Linda McClain on ordered liberty,4 and I to an essay 
on states’ rights.5 After his book with Linda, Jim returned to the 
interpretive wars, and now we’re gathered in appreciation of his 
analysis and critique of the so-called new originalisms,6 theories 
built on the ruins of the old originalisms. I excused myself from 
the debate until now because I thought that there was little to be 
said about constitutional interpretation that hasn’t been said. I 
thought the debate was over, at least as an intellectual matter. I 
thought this because Michael S. Moore convinced me that there 
is a limited number of possible answers to what expressions like 
due process and equal protection mean;7 answers to this question 
entail different approaches to constitutional meaning; and Ronald 
Dworkin and Moore have shown that one and only one approach 
to interpreting such expressions makes sense.8 Dworkin called this 
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approach the moral reading; Jim and I call it the philosophic 
approach.9 
Our choice of “the philosophic approach,” as distinguished 
from “the moral reading,” reflected our positive view of the 
Constitution as a whole. Influenced by writers like Frank 
Michelman, Lawrence Sager, Walter Murphy, and Martin 
Diamond,10 we concluded that an ends-oriented or, if you prefer, 
an aspirational or justice-seeking view of the Constitution, as 
distinguished from dominant emphases on rights and processes, 
was the only defensible view of the Constitution as a whole. In 
CIBQ, Jim and I combined the aspirational view of constitutional 
ends with the moral reading of constitutional rights, and called it 
the philosophic approach to constitutional meaning. We added a 
chapter on The Federalist to show how our views both on 
substance and interpretive approach reflected the thought of the 
American founding and the constitutional text. Additional 
chapters showed how leading writers on the other side of the 
issues fell short of simple coherence, not to mention fidelity to 
textual and historical sources, and, as far as I was concerned, that 
was that. There was nothing more to be said, or so I thought, and 
so I continue to think. 
I continue to think this because whether you’re talking about 
the meanings of drafters or ratifiers or the general public or all the 
world (today, yesterday, or tomorrow), the word or phrase “x” 
can refer either to (1) “x itself,” or (2) some “definition of x itself,” 
or (3) some “example (or application) of x itself.” And since how 
you approach x depends on what you think you’re approaching, 
any possible approach to the meaning of x can be reduced to one 
of the three approaches that Jim and I describe in CIBQ.11 
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 11. Sub-approaches will depend on what you regard as evidence of what you’re 
looking for. If, for example, you think meaning lies in how a word or phrase is applied and 
you seek Gertrude’s meaning of “due process,” you could seek evidence in third-person 
descriptions of her conduct. Or you might be able to interview her. Or you could examine 
her writings, published and private. Thus you might find yourself engaged in several 
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But if there’s nothing new to say about the correct approach 
to constitutional interpretation, there are questions to ask about 
the persistent recurrence of originalism. What exactly is it that 
keeps originalism alive? Can it define or redefine itself in a form 
that avoids the fatal criticisms of its original form? Can there be a 
nonoriginal originalism, or is the only truly nonoriginal 
originalism an abstract originalism that’s equivalent to the 
philosophic approach, as Jim and I argued in 2007? Jim’s new 
book answers these questions. He explains the reluctance of 
writers like Jack Balkin and Bruce Ackerman to abandon 
originalism altogether by their commitments to democracy and 
the rule of law. These writers try to rehabilitate originalism 
because they see the alternative, i.e., the philosophic approach, as 
licensing unelected judges to freight constitutional language with 
their partisan preferences, to the detriment of both democracy 
and the rule of law. In response, Jim notes that unlike the old 
originalists, who claimed to find constitutional meaning in 
expected applications of constitutional provisions, the new 
originalists seek constitutional meaning in original public 
meanings or broad constitutional principles as originally 
understood. Yet, says Jim, correctly, the abstract nature of 
original public meanings and general principles leaves no other 
way to apply them except through controversial moral choices. 
And because responsible judges—judges responsible to the public 
they serve—would be prepared to defend their choices with 
public arguments, the new originalism, honestly deployed, would 
merge with the very philosophic approach that it seeks to reject. 
I completely agree with this part of Jim’s approach to the new 
originalism. My reason is partly a simple matter of logic. Consider 
again the notion of due process. Maybe “due process” is an empty 
vessel into which we individually or collectively pour any meaning 
that, from time to time, suits our individual or collective purposes. 
We can profess this kind of skepticism, but we can’t really believe 
it. Whatever we profess for some purpose or another on different 
occasions, we can’t help believing that due process refers to 
something other than opinions about itself. If we believed 
otherwise, opinions about due process would be opinions about 
nothing at all. But this would be impossible: you can’t have an 
opinion about nothing at all. Well, you might say: What about 
 
specific activities in search of “her meaning.” Yet all of these research methods serve an 
“applications approach” to meaning. 
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ghosts or unicorns? To which I’d respond that though the unicorn 
doesn’t exist in nature, you can still have opinions about it, 
because the unicorn has an existence separate from opinions 
about it. Unicorns exist in fiction as a kind of thing made up of 
things that exist separately in nature, namely “horse” and “horn.” 
A unicorn is thus a fictional horse-like animal with one horn 
protruding from the center of its forehead or the top of its head 
(“forehead,” “head,” “center,” and “top” being ideas abstracted 
from things and relationships of things in the world as ordinary 
humans everywhere and at all times seem to understand the 
world). So, fictional thing though a unicorn is, opinions about it 
can be wrong, and the thing itself (i.e., a unicorn) is universally 
taken to exert a normative influence on opinions about it. This 
last contention is an empirical proposition that you can test for 
yourself. Mention to a dozen people of appropriate experience 
that on your last visit to the Metropolitan Museum of Art you saw 
a Roman crater depicting a hornless unicorn with black and white 
stripes being attacked by a lion. We can all predict the response, 
in substance if not in exact wording. 
So opinions about due process must be taken to be opinions 
about something other than the opinions. That something can 
only be either about (1) “due process itself,” or (2) a definition 
(conception) thought to be of due process itself, or (3) a concrete 
historical application thought to be of due process itself, or (4) a 
string of such applications. If (1) isn’t thought to exist, then (2) is 
impossible, for one can’t have an opinion of what is thought to be 
nothing at all. If (1) isn’t thought to exist, then (3) and (4) are also 
impossible, for they involve a premise (of law) that contains a 
conception of due process and an additional premise (of fact) 
describing an act, event, or practice in terms of the conception of 
due process. Thus, all possible opinions of “due process” 
presuppose the existence of “due process itself,” as distinguished 
from any opinions “about it.” And all possible opinions of due 
process presuppose “due process itself” as normative on those 
opinions—as correctable in light of better opinions and ultimately 
the truth about “due process itself.” Due process itself thus exerts 
a normative pull on opinions about due process. One response to 
this normative pull is Dworkin’s “moral reading” and Jim’s 
“philosophic approach.” Deny the moral reading or the 
philosophic approach and you’re reduced to silence, or you should 
be reduced to silence, for no one, including the public of “original 
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public meaning” can have an opinion about what one thinks is 
nothing outside that opinion. 
Then there’s “democracy,” ostensibly the highest political 
good of the originalists, old and new, even though it was not the 
highest good of such originalist sources as the Constitution, the 
Declaration of Independence, and The Federalist. Originalism 
won’t die because its alternative, the moral reading, is thought to 
license unelected judges to impose their values on the rest of us, 
and that would be undemocratic, or so it is claimed. Jim’s response 
to this claim is to observe an irony, an irony that originalists have 
created for themselves. They assume, to begin with, and pace the 
living constitutionalists, that the popular sovereign is the 
constituent sovereign. Then in the name of the constituent 
sovereign, they reject the word of the constituent sovereign. That 
word is what Dworkin called the “Constitution as written,” a safe 
judgment on Dworkin’s part since the word of the constituent 
sovereign is by definition the “Constitution as written.” And, in 
relevant part, the Constitution is written in abstract language, 
language that takes ideas like due process as normative for fallible 
opinions about due process—language that compels the moral 
reading, a self-critical effort to do the right thing in constitutional 
cases. 
Jim revisits the interpretative debate to save new originalists 
from themselves. He tries to do this by showing that writers like 
Balkin and Ackerman are closer to Ronald Dworkin, the moral 
reader, than to Raoul Berger, the old originalist. Jim assumes that 
if he proves to the new originalists that there’s no real middle way 
between Berger and Dworkin, they’ll go with Dworkin. But that 
there’s no middle way has been evident for more than a 
generation, and yet writers still try to occupy it. So there may be 
something at work other than untenable conceptions of 
democracy and the rule of law. 
I can’t be confident about what this something is, but my 
guess is that the idea of an elusive moral truth that’s normative 
for our opinions sits uneasy in a culture that depends on relaxing 
moral and aesthetic impediments to growth, reduces citizens to 
consumers, and encourages consumers to believe they know what 
they want and that what’s good is a matter of individual 
preference, not genuine knowledge. This culture is inhospitable 
to the moral reading because, as Dworkin observed long ago, the 
moral reading presupposes moral objectivity and demands an 
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attitude of self-critical striving.12 Where new originalists go next 
depends on where they may come to stand on moral objectivity. 
Jim takes ample notice of the historicism that turns Balkin and 
Ackerman away from moral objectivity (pp. 95-96, 128, 131, 157). 
What I fail to understand is Jim’s optimism about the future of 
constitutional theory in the face of the cultural and intellectual 
barriers to the one mode of interpretation that makes sense. 
My failure to appreciate Jim’s optimism brings reservations 
about Jim’s subject: fidelity to our imperfect constitution. To me, 
the Constitution is what Balkin calls “a Constitution-in-practice,” 
or, simply, the actual workings of our government.13 If the 
government is following all the rules and is still imperfect, it must 
be failing to approximate the ends for which it was established. 
What reason, then, could there be for fidelity to such a 
government? I can see why one would be faithful to a government 
that’s better than available alternatives. One can also be faithful 
to an imperfect government whose prospects are improving. But 
these forms of fidelity are contingent on progress toward the ends 
of government. Whether we should be faithful to our 
Constitution-in-practice depends on how well it’s doing, and right 
now it’s not doing well, and there’s a good chance that it will soon 
do worse. 
Jim may disagree with all this. I say “may disagree,” for I’m 
not sure. Sometimes he thinks in terms of what I’ll call the “causal 
theory of constitutional failure,” as distinguished from what I’ve 
called an ends-oriented or instrumental theory.14 Jim agrees that 
our government is dysfunctional. But, he says at one point that the 
Constitution isn’t responsible for the dysfunction, and therefore 
the Constitution isn’t failing (p. 169). But this conception of 
constitutional failure clashes with what I consider a test of any 
proposition of constitutional theory: Can we imagine the 
proposition as part of an argument for making (or remaking) a 
constitution? Who, then, would argue for a constitution whose 
sole virtue was that it didn’t cause bad things? Our national 
experience features no such argument. The Federalist doesn’t rest 
its case for a new constitution on the promise that it won’t cause 
bad things. We the People wanted to hear that the proposed 
 
 12. DWORKIN, supra note 8, at 134, 138. 
 13. JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN 
UNJUST WORLD 2 (2011). 
 14. SOTIRIOS BARBER, CONSTITUTIONAL FAILURE 51–52 (2015). 
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constitution would prevent bad things and facilitate good things, 
and good things are what Publius promised. The Preamble of the 
Constitution does the same: We ordain and establish this 
Constitution “in order to form a more perfect Union, establish 
Justice,” etc. I should have thought Jim’s aspirational view of the 
Constitution would have brought him to the same conclusion. 
And at several places Jim does so conclude. At one point he 
says a constitution fails if its institutions prove inadequate to 
constitutional ends, especially if the constituent authority (in our 
case the sovereign people) fails to replace inadequate institutions 
with adequate ones (p. 172). A few pages later he says a clear form 
of constitutional failure would be a people’s loss of the capacity 
to change or reform a constitution (p. 175). And he may 
ultimately locate constitutional failure or success where it 
belongs: in the political psychology of the American people—the 
character and habits of mind that make the nation capable or 
incapable of structural reform (p. 178). His concluding thought on 
the subject is that while we should be faithful to our imperfect 
constitution by improving it where we can through means inside 
and outside the Court (moral readings by common-law judges 
along with critical elections and social movements that change 
constitutional practice outside Article V), we should also seek 
ways to “cultivate the civic virtues and foster the capacities 
needed to maintain constitutional self-government” (pp. 186-87). 
Jim may disagree, but his concluding advice suggests that 
constitutional fidelity rests on hopes for cultural change. I’d say 
dramatic cultural change—change well beyond the capacity of our 
institutions. (Think of problems like climate change, the income 
gap, and advancing oligarchy; then think Article V, the Electoral 
College, and the composition and internal rules of the U.S. 
Senate.) I can see an argument for trying to live with the present 
constitution in view of no hope for anything better, but any such 
argument would rest on a standard of judgment other than the 
Constitution itself. It would fall short of a real argument for 
constitutional fidelity. 
